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The Optimal Employment of
Inputs in Fee-for-Service,
for-Profit Health Practices:
The Case of Optometrists
ABSTRACT:In this paper, I examine the employment of inputs byop-
tornetrists in private practice. The principal finding derived from the utility
maximization model and production function estimates is that the hy
pothesis that optometrists are employing the optimalamount of aide in-
put cannot be rejected. Thisisin conflict with findings from similar
research on physicianpractices. The productive efficiency ofop-
tometrists in group and solo practice is also compared.
[iiINTRODUCTION
Most primary health professionals (physicians,dentists, and optometrists) sup-
ply a large portion of their servicesin fee-for-service, for-profit private practice.
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tion and the National Center for Health Services
Research IPHS Grant P01 HSO0451i. I thank Isaac EhrlKh.
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iovment of Inputsby Optometr1sts
p.
They tillthe combinedroles o manager risk taker, and most productive input
tic productionprocess. Interest Ifl theproduction processes of their 'firms"
has grownin recent yearsbecause of concern over the rapid rise in expen-
ditures forhealth services and becauseof the alleged shortage of primary
health professi05.As a result there is a rapidlyexpanding, ii not yet substan-
tal, health ecOflOniCSliterature in which the producton processesof primary
health professionalsin private practice areexamined to determine whether
productive inputs areorganized in an optimal way. The fewcompleted studies
have been ofphysician practices and the sameconclusion has been reached in
all of them: physiciansdo not appear to be capablyperforming their manageri-
alfunctiOfl. Morespecifically physicians in private practice appearto be under-
employing auxiliary manpowerin the production process.
Reinhardt, for example,concluded from his estimatedproduction function
for physician servicesthat the average Americanphysician could profitably
employ twice the numberof assistants he presentlyutilizes and, by so doing,
increase his hourly rateof output by 25 percent(Reinhardt 1972). Smith, Miller,
and Goiladay (1972)used a linear activity model toanalyze the production of
medical services by physicians inprivate practice andfound that the efficient
use of physicianassistants would increasephysician productivity by49 to
74 percent.1 If these results arecorrect, a substantialportion of the present in
Ilatiori in the price of physicianservices and of thealleged shortage of health
services could be avoidedbut for the poormanagerial performanceof physi-
cians.
My purpose in this paper is toanalyze the production processof op-
tometrists in private practiceand to provide furtherevidence on the manageri-
al performance of primaryhealth professionals. Ifoptometrists also appearto
be using inefficient productiontechniques furtherquestions can beraised
about organizing the delivery ofhealth servicesaround fee_for-service,for-
prof it private practices.
[1.11The Practice of Optometry:An Overview
The primary health services provided
by optometrists areeye examinations
and the prescription and sale oflenses to correctrefractive errors.Besides I it-
ting, optometrists adjust and repair
eyeglasses The meangross incomefrom
professional practice of the sixteenthousand selfemployed optometristsin
the United States is approximately$50,000, implyingthat upward of$800 mil-
lion is spent annually on their services.1
Most optometristsareengaged in solo
practice. About 17 percent ofselfempl0Yed
optometrists are inpartnerships
or group practice (HEW 1973, p.14).318
[21METHOD OF ANAlYSIS
[2.1]Specification of the Production Functions
To produce their services, optometrists in private practice generallycombine
their own time with the time of aides, capital, office space, and otherinputs
Some optometrists, however, do not employ auxiliary manpower in thepro-
duction process. Therefore, the production function specificationshould
reflect the fact that po5itive rates of output can occur when some inputsare
not used in the production process. A functional form that meets thisrequire-
ment was used by Reinhardt in his analysis of the production of physicianser-
vices: The general specification of that function is
Q = All (X e) exp {y,L1 + -f u}
where X denotes inputs that must be used in the productionprocess and L,, in-
puts that can be excluded. The inputs can have either increasingor decreasing
marginal products, and the elasticity of substitution and returnsto scale are not
constrained to constant values.
Because the results may be sensitive to the specification of theproduction
relationship, a Cobb-Douglas production function is alsoestimated in this
study.5
[2.21The Data
The data base for this study is the 1964 NationalEconomic Survey of the
American Optometric Association (AOA). In 1965, nearlyall members of the
AOA were mailed a questionnaire that solicited 1964 dataon the economics
of conducting their optometric practices. About70 percent of practicing op-
tometrists are AOA members. The number ofquestionnaires returned, coded,
and punched by the AOA totaled 4,750,which represented approximately
40 percent of its members.6 Theproportion of members responding to the
survey by regional division of the United States rangedfrom 33 to 45 percent.
In this survey, annual datawere solicited from optometrists on theirgross and
net-before-tax income from practiceoutput (as measured by the number of
eye examinations produced and wholesale valueof eyeglasses sold), wages
and rent paid, the imputedor shadow wage bill of assistants who worked
without pay (e.g., family members),the dollar size of capital stock, hours
worked, and city size. In addition,data were collectedon type of practice
(group or solo)?
[2.3]Measuring Inputs
One problem with the datasolicited in thesurvey is that most of the produc-
tive inputs are measuredin value terms rather thanphysical units. Measuring
[)ouglas (oateloymet of Inputsby Optometrists
puts invalue tern1)0wev. is not an uncommon practice inthe estimation
ofproductioflfhlflCtlOflS (see, forexample, Feldstein 1967, Chap. IV). One ad-
antage ofdoing so is that a built-inquality adjustment is provided. For exam-
ple, the inputhours of higher-quality or moreproductive workers are more
heavily weghtedthan the hours of lower-qualitylabor to the extent that the
former receivehigher wages. Measuring inputs invalue terms does introduce a
potential bias, the size ofwhich depends on the amount of variation inthe fac-
tor pricesoptometrists face. By controllingfor city size in the estimated pro-
duction functions,much of this bias can be eliminated.
The following inputs aremeasured in value terms: annual wagespaid to
assistants, dollar amountof annual rent for office space, flowof capital sei-
vices,8 and imputed wagebill of assistants who workedwthout pay. Data on
the number of hoursworked per week by the optometrist werealso collected
in the survey. Thosefigures, multiplied by 49.3 toapproximate the number of
hours worked per year, werealso included as an input in theproduction func-
tion.9
[2.41The Group Practice Variableand a Summary of theProduction
Function Specifications
Oesides city size, one other independentvariable that is not formally aninput is
included in the estimated productionfunctions. it is a dummyvariable that
equals 1.0 for optometrists in grouppractice. it is includedbecause many ob-
servers of the health careindustry have argued thathealth services can be
more efficientlydeliveredingroup ratherthansolopractice settings.
Reinhardt's production function resultsshowed, for example, that grouppracti-
tioners were capable of generating5.1 percent moreoffice visits from a given
input bundle than solo practitioners.
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Cobb-Douglas:
Q = AH 1P2 Rb3 W'eh5CD e5 U
where:
Q = output
H = optometrist's hours
D = capital flow
R = rent bill
W = aide bill
Cl)group dummy
CS = city size
319[2.51Measuring Output
The explicit output measures solicited in the AOA survey were the wholesale
value of lenses, temples, and frames purchased by tile optometrist durirthe
year and the annual number of eye exanitnationsprovided. A singleOutput
measure can be constructed from this data by converting the wholesale value
of eyeglass components and lenses to number of eyeglasses sold and then
combining this measure with the number of eye exams provided by using an
appropriate weighting scheme. An informal survey of optometrists in the New
York metropolitan area revealed that in 1964 the approximate Wholesale value
of the average pair of eyeglasses provided by optometrists was SID.1hThis
price was used to deflate the AOA wholesale value figure so as to approximate
the physical quantity of eyeglasses provided.
Available data on the prices of eyeglasses and visual examinations can be
used to develop a weighting scheme for combining the numbers of eyeglasses
and eye examinations provided into a single output measure. Lee Benham re-
ports that in 1963 the average combined cost of eyeglasses and an eye ex-
amination in the United States was 538.32 and the average cost of eyeglasses
alone was $2823.11 If the reasonable assumption is made that the relative
values of a pair of eyeglasses and an eye examination were tile same in 1964,
the data indicate that the number of eyeglasses sold should be weighted 2.8
times as heavily as the number of eye examinations supplied when the two
quantities are combined into a single output measure.
The physical measure of output derived from this procedure isa nearly com-
plete description of the output of an optometric practice. This measure should
be an improvement over such output descriptions as patient visitsor patient
billings, which have been used in studies of physician services. In using patient
visits, for example, the assumption must be made that variation in the quantity
of services provided per visit is not correlated with the size of the firm. If,as is
probable, this assumption does not hold, regression estimates of theparam-
eters of the production relationship will be biased, as will the resulting calcula-
tion of returns to scale.12 One advantage of studying the production ofop-
tonietric services to learn more about the production of health services in fee-
for-service, for-profit practice is that the limitedrange of services oftered by
optometrists tas compared to physicians)can be measured quite readily in
physical terms and assumptions suchas the one just discussed need not be
made.
[31A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THEOPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT OF
INPUTS IN THE PRODUCTION OFOPTOMETRIC SERVICES
Before presenting the estimates ofthe production functions for optometric ser-
vices, a framework must be established forinterpreting the regression results. It
is particularly necessary foran analysis of the optimal employment of inputs in
the production process. Asreviewed at the outset of this study, previous iii-Employment of Inputs by Optometrists
vestigators have concluded that physicians in private Vac1i(eare under-
employing auxiliary manpower and placing too low a valueon their own input
in the productionof their services. Since the primarypurpose of this study is to
evaluate how effectively optometrists organize I)roductive inputs, including
their own time, the decision rules that are likely to govern theOptometrists'
practices must be derived.
13.1]The Utility Maximization Model
One reasonable approach to the formulation of these decision-making rules is
to assunie that optometrists maximize a utility function in income and leisure
and that income is derived from professional practice and othersources. Itis
also assumed that income cannot be generated from professional practice
without inputs of the optometrist's time, and that noneniployment income
does not depend on time inputs of the optometrist.
More specifically, let
U= U(L, Y1 + Y,)
11111 - H, PQ(H, Ii,...,- TC(!1,.., !) + Y2]
where
L = hours of leisure
= income from practice
= income from other sources
11 = fixed amount of available hours
H = hours devoted to practice
P = price of output of the practice
Q(H, ii,..., I) = quantity of output produced by a production process using inputs
H,!,.....I,.
TO!1........= total cost of the output produced as determined by the quantity of
inputs purchased in the market
Because the inputs of labor, capital, and office space in the AOA survey were
measured in value terms and the input hours of the optometrist, in physical
terms, the utility function for optometrists can be written as
U= u[fl - H,Q(H, D, W, R, CS, CD) - (V + W+ R ± Y21
In order to maximize utility, the optometrist's employment of factor inputs





321The first-order conditions can be used to calculatethe value or shad'
price optometrists attach to their own time in ternis of theiremployment ofOther productive inputs. For example, the shadowprice the average
optometrist assigns to the value of an hour of his time interms of his employmentof auxili- ary manpower would be
OU/OL(iQ
(3.1) -
Equation 3.1 could also be derived froma profit maximization modelin which the optometrist assignsa shadow price to his own time.
[41THE ESTIMATED REINHARDIPRODUCTION FUNCTION
Estimates of the Reinhardt productionfunction specified aboveare presented in Table 1.The results shownwere obtained exclusively byordinary least squares. The results are biased unless inputsand outputs arenot simultaneous. ly determined. Thisassumption would be justified, forexample, if optometrists
chose current inputson the basis of anticipated, ratherthan current,output Even if inputs and outputsare simultaneously determined, theresulting estima- tion bias may not be large.Reinhardt (1973,pp. 205-210) has concluded that
the OLS estimates of healthcare production functionsare not biased to agreat degree by the simultaneityproblem because physiciansand other primary
health professionals differgreatly in their abilityor willingness tomaximize profits and face substantiallydifferent product and inputprices.
E4.1JThe OptimalEmployment of lnputstheEmpirical Results
The pair ofregressions presented in Table1 differ in the index ofaide input. Re- gression 1 measures aideinput as wages paidto assistants plus theimputed wage for work performed byunpaid aides (e.g.,Spouses); regression 2 includes only the actual annualwage bill. Results foroptometrist's hours and for capital flow (In and In 4D)
are not presented for eitherregression because the estimated coefficientswere not statisticallysignificant. Theestimated coeffi- cients for theremaining variablesare all highly significant, Thecoefficients and statistical significance ofthe city size andgroup dummy variablesare discussed in Appendix A.
To compute theshadow price theaverage Optometrist assignsto an hour of his time interms of his employmentof auxiliarymanpower as defined in equa- tion 3.1, valuesmust be determined forthe marginalproducts and the price of output. If the meansample values for allvariables are substitutedinto the marginal productexpressions, theregression estimatescan be used to deter-
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Dougla, CoateTABLE iRegression Coefficients for Productiona of Optometric Services,
Reinhardt Functional Form
(figures in parentheses are t values)
-
Output s the log of the turn of visual exams and 2.8 times the wholesale valueof lenses and irames.
Aide value is equal to the aide bill plus the value of work performed by unpaid assistants
mine the numerical value of the marginalproducts for the different inputs. For
regression 1, the marginal product of theoptometrist's hours is 0.83 andthe
marginal product of auxiliary manpower is 0.27.Output price is calculated
from the sample data by taking a weighted averageof the gross annual income
per unit of output of each respondingoptometrists where theweight is the
number of units of output produced. Theresulting price per unitof output is
8.04. Substituting this figure and the computed
marginal products into (3.1)
yields a shadow price of $5.50 for an hourof optometrist's time.This result
must be compared with optometrists'"true" value of time todetermine
whether their time is optimally valued in termsof their employmentof auxiliary
manpower. One approximation ofthe "true" value ismarket wage.14 The







Aide bill 0.080 X iO
(26.6)
Aide bill squared 0.11X 10
(-11.0)
City size 0.055 0.054
(11.0) (11.0)




F ratio 235.8 246.4
N 3,814 3,814
independent
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
In optometrists hours 0.423 0.426
(12.4) (1251
In capital flow 0.123 0.120
(9.5) (9.2)
In rent bill 0.118 0.122
(4.3) (4.4)
Rent 0.033 X 10-s 0.033 X 10
(-2.6) (-2.6)$
1964 AOA survey on the before-tax net income, hours, and experience 01Op-
tometrists employed by other optometrists and by physicians. A regression of
the before-tax net annual income of salaried optometrists divided by hours
worked per week (Y/I-D run on years of experience (F) and L2 yields the follow-
ing results (t statistics in parentheses):
(32)Y/H = 161.30 + 12.44E -0.22E2
(3.7) -2.6)
R2 = 0.10; N= 16
The mean hourly earnings of optometrists employed by physicians and Other
optometrists in 1964 was $5.00, assuming salaried optometrists on average
worked 49.3 weeks per year)'
The average market hourly wage for the labor of self-employedoptometrists
can be predicted from (3.2). Because the mean years of experience of self-
employed optometrists in the AOA sample was 15.8, comparedto 10.5 years
for those on salary, the predicted market hourly wage forself-employed
optometrists is $6.1 5.
The difference between the estimated shadow price of 55.50 andthe calcu-
lated market wage is not statistically significant. A precise significancetest can-
not he formulated because the shadow price is determined inpart from
marginal product expressions that consist of the product ofa relatively large
number of random variables. A crude but informativestatistical test can be
conducted, however, by observing the sensitivity of the shadowprice to varia-
tions in the estimated production functionparameters. For example, if the
coefficient of the log of optometrist's hours is allowedto increase by one stan-
dard deviation, the estimated shadow priceincreases to $7.50. Thus, even it
the var!ation is eliminated by assumption in allparameters but one, a shift in
that one coefficient within the bounds ofstatistical error is sufficient to yield a
shadow price in excess of the marketwage. Equation 3.1 and the production
function estimates indicate theoptimal wage billis $5,000, given the op-
tometrist's market wage of $6.15 and assumingother inputs are employed at
their sample means. Although thisvalue is 38 percent greater than the sample
mean wage bill (including the value of unpaid work)of $3,620, the discrepancy
is not statistically significantgiven the foregoing considerations.
The shadow price ofan hour of optometrist's time in terms of capital
employment can he computed from(3.1) if JQ/8W is replaced byQ/OD.
The marginal product of capitalis 0.52 if sample meansare substituted into the
marginal product expressionand the estimates of regression 1ae used. The
computed shadow priceis then $3.49, which is substantially less than the
market wage of $6.15,although the differencecannot be considered
statistically significant. Thegap between market wage and shadow price isre-
duced markedly by allowingvariations in a single parametric estimate. If the
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coefficient of the logof optometrist's hours is again allowed to increase by one
standard error, the shadow price of optometrist's time in terms of capital
employment increases to almost $5.00. Equation 3.1and the production furic-
Uon estimatesindicate that the optimal capital flow is $2,000, given the op-
tometrist's opportunity costof $6.15 and assuming other inputs are employed
at their sample means.The average capital bill in the AOA sample was $922.
The calculated marginal product ofoffice space is 0.05 if the regression
results of (1) are used in conjunctionwith the sample means in the marginal
product expression. This result isquestionable and not only because a negative
marginal product is inherently dillicult to accept. Bias isintroduced because
the rent bill is not an adequateindex of the physical quantity of floor space.
Rents per unit of space varyfor a variety of reasons that are not related to the
productivity of the space in the production process.One example is the direct
relationship between rent per unitof space and access to population con-
centrations. Because of the biasintroduced when using rents as a proxy for
floor space, a discussion of anoptimal rent bill is omitted.
In regression 2 the measureof aide input is the actual annual wage bill paid
by the optometrist. The valueof the work of unpaid assistants is not included,
as it is in the aide input measurein regression 1. Because not all of theauxiliary
manpower input is accountedfor, the inputs should appear moreproductive
than they actually were. Thecalculated marginal products for optometrist's
hours and aide input are slightly higherif the parametric estimates of (2)rather
than (1) are used. The marginal productof optometrist's hours increases to
0.86 and the marginal product of aides increasesto 0.29. The marginalproduct
ci capital stays constant at 0.52.
Substituting the marginal productscomputed from (2) into (3.iJyields
shadow values for an hour of optometrist'stime of $5.58 in terms ofaide input




Because the results just discussed maybe sensitive to thespecification of the
production function, the shadow pricesand optimal inputlevels obtained from
estimation of a Cobb-Douglas productionfunction are comparedwith results
from the Reinhardt form. For thiscomparison, the observationsOfl optometric
practices where auxiliary manpower wasnot used mustbe deleted froni the
sample because a constraint of theCobbDOugIa5 functionalform is that a
positive rate of output can occuronly if all inputs areused in the production
process. Deletion of those casesreduces the workingsample from 3,814 to
2,782 observations.
32S0
aOUIPUI is the log of thesum of eye exams and 2.8 times the wholesale valueof lenses and frames bAide valueis equal to the aide bill plus the value of workperformed by unpaid asvstants
Regression results for thetwo production functionsare presented in Table 2. Since the rent variablewas not statistically significantin the estimated Cobb- Douglas function, it doesnot appear in thecorresponding regression. The calculated marginal productsimplicit in the results for theReinhardt specifica- tion are 0.80, 0.20, and0.44 foroptometrist's hours, aides, and capital.The weighted average of theprice of output in theabbreviated sample is $7.96. Substituting marginal productsand output price intoequation 3.1, as before, yields a shadowprice of $5.78 for an hour ofoptometrist's time in terms of aides and $3.86 interms of capital input.For the Cobb-Douglasspecification, the marginal products foroptometrist's hours, aides, andcapital are 0.81, 0.28, and 0.35, and the shadowprices of optometrist'stime in terms of aides and
TABLE 2egression Coefficients for Production' of OptometricServices,
Reinhardt and Cobb-Douglas Functional Forms,Abbreviated
Sample






Regression 3 Regression 2
Inoptonietrist'shours 0.356 0.334 0.334
(9.5) (9.15) (9.15)
In capital flow 0.102 0.074 0.074
(7.6) (5.6) (56)
In rent bill 0.084 0.002 X 10'
(2.8) (0.14)
In aide valueb 0.275 0275
(24.6) (25.0)
Rent 0.024 X 10
(-2.0)
Aidevalueb 0.051 X 1O
(18.2)
Aide value' squared 0.06 X 1 0
(-6.1)
Cay size 0.046 0.047 0.047
(8.8) (9.4) (9.8i Group dummy 0.047 0.048 0.049
(2.0) (2.1) (2.2) Constant 4.01 2.88 2.90
R2 0.25 0.29 0.29 F ratio
N
112.8 186.3 223.7
2,782 2,782 2,782EniploYrnent of Inputs byOptometdsts 327
capital are $5.21 and $4.66.As before, the shadow prices computed from the
abbreviated sample are lowerthan the market wage of $6.16,1but the
differences cannot beconsidered statistically significant.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDINGREMARKS
The most striking characteristicof these results is that the hypothesis that op-
tometrists are employingthe optimal amount of aide input cannot be re-
jected.17 It may be true, asReinhardt reported, that physicians could profitably
expand their employment of aides,but that does not appear to be true for op-
tometrists.1 One reason whyoptometrists may be able to organize their prac-
tices more efficiently thanphysicians is that the latter may have a greaterfear
of compromising the quality of carethey provide if they increase the substitu-
tion of other inputs for their owntime in the production process.It is true that
malpractice claims have become arelatively common occurrence inmedicine,
but they remain very rare inoptometry.
Although the principle finding ofthis research is that optometrists mayin-
deed be employing the optimal amountsof aide input, it is also true that strong
support for the postulatethat optometric practices areefficiently organized is
not evident. Each estimateof the shadow price ofoptometrists' time in terms
of aide and capital input hasbeen less than theirestimated market wage. op-
tometrists could be operatingefficiently and at the same timeplacing a rela-
tively low value on their own timein the production processif some of their
working hours must be spent inthe office waiting forpatients many of whom
come without an appointment.During this time theycould be completing
many of the activitiesthey would delegate toaides it they were busier.
Similarly, they could afford tospend a substantial portionof time with each pa-
tient they do serve and wouldbe less concernedwith task delegation inthe
treatment process. There is someevidence for this idletime hypothesis.
Haffner (1971, p. 32) found inhis 1970 national surveyof over 2,000 op-
tometrists that 22 peicent ofall respondentsfelt their optometricpractices
under their present structurecould accommodate over30 percent more pa-
tients. The median respondentfelt his optometricpractice could accommo-
date 18 percent more patientsunder its presentstructure.
APPENDIX A:THE VARIABLESFOR GROUPPRACTICE AND CITYSIZE
The group dummy variable inthe Reinhardtproduction functionestimated
over the full sample,with aide inputmeasured as theactual wage bill plusthe$
value of work performed byunpaid aides, indk:ates that theoptom(ri5ii) group practice produced,on average, about 5 percent moreoutput thano tornetrists in solo practice tora given input bundle (see Table 1,regression 1) A superior technical efficiencyof the group practitioneris not apparent Inre- gression 2, Table '1, where aideinput is measured as wages paidto assisting
nianpower and does not include imputedwages of unpaid assistantsIn this regression the coefficient of thegroup dummy falls to 0.02 and isnot signifi- cantly different fromzero at accepted confidene levels. Thereason for the difference in these resultsis that solo optometrists used $500worth of unpaid help while groupoptometrists used only $250 worth.Since the solopracti- tioner had S250 more ofunmeasured aide input than thegroup practit)ner the former canappear to be as technically efficientas the latter.
In all the estimated productionfunctions, the city-sizevariable is highlysig- nificant. The measure ofcity size conssts ofseven different populationcatego- ries, with higher values of thevariable being associatedwith smaller-sizecities The regression results thenappear to indicate that the smallerthe city, the more efficient is the production ofoptometric services. Howeverthis is un- doubtedly an illusion. Themore reasonable interpretationis that the prices of productive inputs are lowerin small cities than in largeones, If so, holding the dollar value of inputsconstant in the production functiondoes not hold the physical quantitiesconstant. Optometrists in smallercities would appearto he more productive if they havemore inputs to work withper dollar of expen- diture,
NOTES
"Physician assistant' refersto a category of pardprofe
ok specific a(ly trainedto perform a variety ot medical tasks.
2it should be noted that
other investigators haveconcluded that auxiliarymanpuwis Over- employed relative to physician
input in hospitals and clinicsFeldstein (1 96,pp 100-101 concluded trorn his estimated
production tunction for Britishhospitals that "toorout h is being spent onnurses, catering and othersupplies and not enoughon doctors drugs and dressings 'Feldstein recommendedthat the number ofdoc tOrs in Britishhospitals he in- creased relative to otherinputs. Pauly 1975),usIng data on rural hospitalsin the Midwest also concluded that hospitalInputs are overused relativeto physcian inputs in theprodu- Lion of hospitalservices Boaz 1972 p. 204i,in her production analysisot nineteen famils. planning clinics, concludedthat the clinics shouldexpand their employmentof phsicians, for "the high feecharged by the physicianis more than offset by hrsmarginal productivity compared to other personnel
in 1963 therewere 18,299 optonletriqcin active practice
Self-employed Optometriststo- taled 16,218 (HEW1973). in 1969, themean annual grossincome of practicing°ptonietrists was $46,000 (Chipman1970, p. 551.
For a more Completedescription of theproperties of this Productionfunction see Reinhardt 1970, App. C).
5Because the Cobb-Douglas




DousIas est mates Iii I lii ist' ipU )illI.'t ii(S .5 liii 4'inpli iyed ,it Itist 5(1011' ot ea h rireasurecl1-
pUt 1 ht'se results atei iml)cirecl with ectitilati's ot the lU'inliardt toni. tamover the same ah-
breViate(l saiii; tie.
bThis response Nile inot uilUsLic)lly OW. I or esiirlpic. the I7 \Ieria if fi. i)IiOiiiiisurvey ot
of lice- lised physic ian prac I ices also y ekied a Wi irk iflg sample I hit Ct illS stt'd oh 4)) peo ent
ot the surveyed Iii iUlcit Ii in. See Will Sell - Fnipioytd Phys ii mcriis Net Out Ahead\ h'da a!
Econofli! s (October 15, 1973), p. 251
7The ADA sani pie is I or I her dec rthed in the iii mtli)y issueS mit the Jmirmrrial (itIiiAitiera an
Optonietrit Asoc iat ion hr April through Dc tiliei 1966
8Depreciation figures were cii 0 explic itlyollec ted in the ADA si iivey.I lie lii )W otapit ii
was ippri lxi mated by Iakiig 10 percent of thereported value ol tireapital St 0 k.
9[he figure fur average weeks worked per year was0111 10 ted by the aut hiiimm dataol -
es ted ill &ire 1968 survey of optoilletristcunduc tvd by the N,irinal Center tor (health
Satistm( s.I he ak ulat ii in was based iii the data repi in i'd irl IA( ) A 1969. p. 11 94).
1(1A telephone sujrvev of several optonlut rrsts in private pra toe in toeNew Yr ,rk metrop ilitan
area, randomly seleCted trorii tiliplronctiiru (1 rim's. was not SOC ( &'sshul[lit iiptoirletrmsts
were apparently reluc (a ut to gmc e any mrmatii>il (hat I. 1)01(1 he used rm i dv teinliire the
markup on eyeglasses troll) the wholesale to ietarl levellte ause of the driticultycion-
duc Ii ng the telephone survey, four 0101 imet rots on ticfaculty of the Schi rot ot OptometrY.
State University of New York, with private pral to e experience, wereasked their estiniate of
the 1964 wholesale value of the mater:als iii the average pairof eyeglasses.
11These figures werem,unpileil by lienhanl ) 1972) trirni data(riley ted ill the 1961 Natuinal
Health Survey that provided the data have for Andersenand Anderson t1967).
12.It is likely that large physician firms doprovide inure services per visit than small ones
because the former offer a wider range of on-preinlisesancillary servk es such as X rays and
laboratory tests. A small physician firm may heunable to utilize sophisticated laboratory
equipment ef ficrently and would be c onipelled toicIer its patients to, say.11iilii)Cial
lahoratoiy for those services.
13The ADA sample was edited down to 3,81 5 observationsby deleting respondents who
were not self -employed or did not reporteither the number of eye examsprovided or the
wholesale value of the eyeglass omponents pun.
based during the year. Mean values were
inserted for missing observations or) inputs used inthe production process.
14The use of tile market wage ot cpu rnictrist s 0ii mdi itor cittirealoe mit the sif-
employed optometrist's Ii me entails tile is50nlpt11 in
that srmnilar 1cc hni iii Igles govern the
production of optometric services by salariedand self_eniployed optonietrtS. Itmust also
he ,issumned that the average and niarginal wagesof salaried optometrists ireequal because
the market wages computed ill this paper are averagesvageshiili the silidoSV value of o-
tometrist N (line is c 01 nputed ut themargin.
The calculation of the market svage is also
helpful when considering tile questic iiint ett
ciency tt0m ci dii tirent perspective.t t .ould he argued that ifniimket opi irtunitmes (lit tale
511CC ialia( ion thiti optonletri sts irtmaki rig et ficient c boo es aslong as their average is age
from Se) f-employ rent exceeds (heir averagewage from salariedemploy nlm'iit.it (an hi'
shown that the (marginal) shadow procof optometrists time vailhe tomnpared with the
market wage to analyze efficient
occupational choice under tileassuniptionslat op-
tometrists are identical in ill respe tshut specialize in citilersell- or salarieden1phrmYilient
and that the proclur t ion func (mliii fmmr
optometric services is Ii nearhomogeilv( us.
15[lie annual weeks worked figure ot 49.3is the sarile as thefigure der:vd liii selt-einployed
optometnsts.
lb.The mean years of experience of opl(iiiletrm5tsin the abbreviatedsample is 1 5.9. Using 0).
the predicted market wage of theseoptofll(trists is $6.16, assuming49.3 weeks worked in
1q64.
Fnplo\'flleet oflitpul'hs()pk itlietrists 32917This finding is not sensitive to the weighting wht'rne used to iunsh,net've &'\anhinatiins and
number of eyeglasses sold into a single Output Irieasure. Production functionestimates and
computed shadow vatucs of optometrist's tiiiic' resulting trom differentassurnptiuis about
the weighting scheme used to construct the outputmeasuie are available on requiest to the
author.
18.It is possible that Reinhardt's findings are a statiste al artifact thatresults from mperlect
measures of phys'c:an output. The use of physician visits as an Outputmeasure may pro-
duce an upward bias in the ratio of the marginal productivityof aides relative to that of
physicians. In other words, aides may be more productive in producingan OrIce Visit, re'a-
tive to physicians, than they are in the production of true physicianservices. Reinhardtc ijse
of patient billings as an alternative outputmeasure svould at least partialiy correct for this
bias, however. And his findings when using thisoutput measure sti!l indicated a substantial
opportunity for aide expansion.
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